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LIONS UNDER THE THRONE. By Charles P. Curtis, Jr. Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin Co., 1947. Pp. 361. $3.50.
THE NINE YOUNG MEN. By Wesley McCune. New York: Harper & Bros.,
1947. Pp. 293. $3.50.
I wonder if a scholar can become a gentleman without ceasing to be a
scholar. For, in their association, propriety intrudes to compromise the search
for truth. These two authors, with a common subject, differ in the crafts they
practice; but they are alike in allowing gentility to civilize objective analysis.
Neither states that the nine young men as a Court are more unresponsive to the
demands of justice-I pass up the word reactionary-than the nine old men who
occupied the same chairs ten years ago. And I am far too much a creature of
the amenities to make such a statement myself. But, if the scalpel had won a
victory over good manners, I, for the defense, would be hard put to it for facts
with which to answer back.
For the last few terms have been marked by a lapse from law to legalism.
The current bench seems to have lost its feel for "the jugular." It seems, in
the usual proceeding, unable to escape the irrelevant, to cut through lawyer-
created issues, to find the real question which alone is of concern to the human
men and women, natural and corporate, whose quarrels got the judicial proc-
ess going. Instead it carries on as if it had been decreed that the actual issue,
waiting patiently on the sidelines, had to abide the outcome of a bout at dialectic.
Only two or three times in its history, and never for so long a period, has the
Court elevated logomachy above human reason.
This attitude of living in a world of legal mores rather than of human
conflict is too evident to require detailed example. By a few none too clever
phrases, a man's home ceases to be his castle in spite of a direct prohibition
in the Constitution against searches and seizures without proper warrant.'
Even the law must yield to the belief, established in the newspapers, that John
L. Lewis is Public Enemy No. 1; and to that end Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
presents arguments to his colleagues for approval.2 If the arguments lack
support in law, his brethren have a choice between them. A government em-
ployee, however long, efficient and faithful his service, can be dismissed upon
an allegation, responsible or irresponsible, that he is disloyal. The Bill of
Rights is too sacred to be put to so secular a use as his protection.3 The Con-
gress, by fitting the anti-trust acts with an enlarging number of remedies,
has sought the protection alike of small business, the system of free enter-
prise and the public. But, where the legislature has given, Mr. Jackson by
1. Harris v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947).
2. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 67 Sup. Ct. 677 (1947).
3. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (Mem.) 67 Sup. Ct. 979 (1947), (cert. denied). On
second petition, cert. denied 67 Sup. Ct. 1302 (1947) (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting).
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a play on words, a bit of fudging, and a disregard for precedents, has taken
away a defense which was ancient when the Statute of lonopolies was
written.4
It is a matter of common knowledge that the way of the Court with a case
has changed. The way of a serpent on a rock or a man with a maid may be
as eternal as it is wonderful; but, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has told us,
"fashions" in judicial rhetoric belong to the times.5 The very feel of the opin-
ions distinguishes the New Court from the old. The Four Horsemen plus
Roberts and/or Hughes were honest and bold in their attempt to turn the
hands of the clock back. If they did not like coal control, the minimum wage T
or relief for dirt farmers, s they said so by directly reading their prejudices
into the constitution. On the present Court, Vinson, C. J., and Frankfurter,
Jackson and Burton, JJ., often joined by Reed, J. arrive at a kindred result
by finding-or devising-ways to prevent the substantive question from being
reached. Thus, a patent may be invalid; but Frankfurter, relying upon a
precedent which is irrelevant, insists that the litigant is estopped from rais-
ing the issue.9 Bruce may be the victim of an unlawful price-system, but
he must pay the penalty for having selected the wrong cause of action.10 A
perplexed litigant should have persevered with his original suit; when, anxious
to do the right thing, he started all over, he lost his legal rights."1 Such instances
-and they are legion-indicate a state of mind so esoterically judicial that a
slight deviation from correct procedure-often existing only in the mind of the
justice-is amortal sin, while a serious miscarriage of justice is only a venal one.
A mythology has been created in defense of the lapse of the Court from
the great tradition of the law. It is that the two wings of the present Court
represent an "activist" and a "legal" attack upon the cases. Thus Black,
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., play their economic preferences, while
Vinson, Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, JJ., are content to sit back and
refer the cases to "the law." The author from Washington gets around too
much to swallow this fiction; the author from Boston, for all his critical
gifts, is too much attached to Cambridge completely to escape it. It does have
a bit of oblique truth; for Douglas, Black, ct al. have competence in the dis-
cussion of substantive questions, while Frankfurter chooses to operate in the
4. Bruce's Juices, Inc., v. American Can Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1015 (1947), 55 Yiu.z L. J.
820 (1946) (on first hearing).
5. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946), 56 YALE L. J. 893 (1947).
6. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 23S (1936).
7. N.Y. v. Morehead ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
8. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
9. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Co. 32:9 U.S. 402, 403
(1947). Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 394, 403, (1947)
(joint dissent. Frankfurter spoke for a minority of four, not for the Court.)
10. Bruce's Juices, Inc., v. American Can Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1015 (1947), 55 YALE L.J.
820 (1946) (on first hearing).
11. Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 (1947), 56 YALE L.J. 1037.
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procedural field where he has. confidence in his own footing. But rarely does
Jackson, who of all the members of the court is most fertile in his leads,
fail to adorn an opinion with an amateur's excursion in economics, And
Burton's occasional discussion of industrial situations are alike indications of
painstaking work and quite devoid of understanding.' 2 If a shift is made
from the rhetoric in which they are cast to the rationale of decision, the differ-
ence in motivation between the two groups fades. Frankfurter affects a lack of
concern for the "end product'; yet his votes are to be predicted in terms of the
end product. You can almost always tell where he is coming out; yet not even
the faithful can tell in advance how his stand is to be legalized. Frankfurter
spurns "policy" and professes to lay the law down on the line. Yet lie usually
gets to the same place as Jackson whose law is not unspotted by the world. The
work of the current term is marked by numerous instances of the search for a
decent way of doing an indecent thing.
Along such lines a job of significance needs to be done. So 1 regret that in
both books downright analysis has come off second-best in its battle with
gentility. It was the-law journals, reversing the decisions of the Supreme
Court, -which led the fight on the Old Court. The nine young men have been
subjected to no such critical and disinterested bombardment. A host of truths,
quite ugly truths, need to be spoken. It does no good to impute personal
blame. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has no feel for the dominant issues; he op-
erates best when weaving crochet patches of legalism on the fingers of the
case. He does the best he can, often very well indeed, with the techniques in
which he is proficient; it is a calamity that his skills happen to be petty skills. He
is the victim of a bad legal education; but the Court has no business allowing
him to select, from all the issues the case holds, the question upon which it must
turn. The Old Court may have been any bad thing you wish to call it; but in
backwardness it was bold and did not hide its naughtiness behind a curtain. The
new Court is a lion in condemning iniquity, and a lamb in putting an effective
stop to it; compare the roar of the Yellow Cab case, 8 with the please-won't-you-
be-good of National Lead.'4 But, in a retreat from old ways, a respect for the
province of the legislature does not carry an immunity to judicial responsibility.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Southeas.tern Underwriters;'r created the
doctrine that wrong once vested becomes too sacred to be disturbed. And the
current Court has shown no avidity to discover exactly what the law says
when the result would be to dispossess the interest which is established.10
It is the glory of our law that it was born of, and does not stray far from
12. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1634 (1947).
13. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1560 (1947).
14. United States v. National Lead Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1634 (1947).
15. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
16. See,-e.g., U.S. v. The Pullman Co., Mem., 67 Sup. Ct. 1078 (1947). Here a three-
judge Court denounced iniquity in no uncertain terms; but, as for relief which was effec-
tive, it decided that the powers of equity did not extend to a business judgment. Its decl-
(Vol. S61460
REVIEWS
the facts of life. The craft of the common-law judge, who worked in the
great tradition, was to apply the law to the actual case. The mark of great
judges from Hale and Holt and Mansfield to Holmes and Cardozo has been
the quality of judgment. Long ago it was remarked that the letter kills and
the spirit gives life. As procedure is the instrument, not the master of the
law; so that law is the instrument, not the master, of justice.
"IVALTox HAM.iILTON f
BOTH these books are recent studies of the workings of the Supreme Court
as the third branch of our government. IcCune's is lively, entertaining and
amusing. Rarely does a book live up to the blurb on the jacket; his is an
exception. It deals mainly with the court since 1937 when Roosevelt trans-
formed it after the collapse of his ill-advised plan to get rid of the old Court by
packing the new. The story is told in biographical form, dealing with each
justice in a separate chapter, alternating with chapters on civil liberties, the
war decisions, and other recent decisions of the Court as a whole. Consider-
able space is given to the Supreme Court plan of 1937 and its vicissitudes and
to the feud between Justices Jackson and Black. The biographical material
is not of a muck-raking character but, in an impartial way, seeks to do justice
to the propensities and characteristics of the various judges.
It is a pity that so meritorious a book is marred by signs of hasty proof-
reading, though the errors that have crept into the story will not materially
affect its reading. Many of the anecdotes are new and the style, while racy
and colorful, is never vulgar. To many it is a misfortune that the Supreme
Court ever assumed the power to declare federal legislation unconstitutional
for it has thrown the Court into politics. But since it occupies that position,
the informative, light method of treatment adopted by this book is preferable
to the ponderous analysis to be found in most law books. The author pre-
serves the human element in the court's composition while yet analyzing with
sympathetic pen their New Deal decisions.
The book by Curtis, while resembling McCune's in the pithiness of its
sentences, deals with the Supreme Court from a somewhat different angle.
Instead of the journalist addressing lawyers, as was MLcCune, we find in
Curtis a sophisticated and learned lawyer addressing laymen. Valuable as
this book is in analyzing the judicial process, I am inclined to think that lay-
men will be baffled by his analyses and that lawyers are likely to derive more
profit than laymen. Curtis examines the work of the Court as an exemplifica-
sion was affirmed on appeal by "an evenly divided Court." The vote is not of record;
but it can be set dowm with certainty that the votes for reversal were by Black, Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge, JJ. In reaching the conclusion that Vinson, C. J., Frankfurter,
Jackson and Burton, JJ. voted to affirm, no legalistic criteria have been employed.
- Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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tion of the judicial process. What he has to say about particular cases will
prove of value to lawyers, statesmen and philosophers-a combination he
demands of every Supreme Court justice. Where McCune is amusing, Curtis
is serious. He is concerned with a serious theme and cannot help the result.
He deals adequately with the New Deal and especially with the growth of
civil liberty. There is a temptation to read his book over again for even to an
experienced man it is none too easy to follow. It is almost certain that the
book will be accepted as a valuable contribution to constitutional law and that
the judges of the Court will find it profitable to read.
Because the authors fail to analyze all questions of international law and all
questions of procedure, they omit discussion of the dubious opinion in United
States v..Pinkl-sustaining a Russian confiscation of a debt from a New York
bank to a Russian creditor, and Tileston v. Ullsani-in which the doctor, a
victim and the target of an anti-contraceptive statute, was not allowed to
challenge the statute because forsooth he had not joined as parties plaintiff the
three women who would have profited by his advice.
It is my personal opinion that the present court is much the best that we
have had. Both the content and the literary form of its decisions seem
superior to the cliches of the past. Inevitably, there will be differences of
opinion among such men. It is a misfortune that practically none of the
judges has the necessary background in international law. At least, Chief
Justice Stone had a chance to submit troublesome questions to John Bassett
Moore. None of the others appear to have availed themselves of that oppor-
tunity. EDWIN BORCHARft
It has become a commonplace to say, or assume, of the current Supreme
Court that the big conservative-liberal battle lies behind it; that the nine new
Justices are all of them liberals of varying degrees of persuasion; that their
doctrinal differences-by contrast to the old Court's split over progressive
legislation-are quite minor matters as government by judiciary goes. I
wonder. For there are more ways than one to skin a cat or a statute, and the
stiletto of "interpretation" will serve as well as the old battle-axe of "uncon-
stitutionality" in the hands of a Justice resistant to social reform.
Is it really any more conservative to oppose, on whatever legal pretext,
federal regulation of the coal industry than to oppose, on whatever legal pre-
text, federal regulation of the insurance industry under the anti-trust laws?
Is it really any more conservative to vote against a national plan for financial
aid to farmers than to vote against a national plan for financial aid to railroad-
shippers, including farmers? Is it really any more conservative to defend the
right of employers to pay low wages than to defend the right of utilities to
1. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
2. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
" Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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charge high rates? Or is it perhaps true, despite the current commonplace
about an essentially liberal Court from stem to stern, that the same basic
battle between the privileges of property and the control of those privileges is
stiil being waged, but on a different legal level-with the "interpretation" of
patent laws, tax laws, labor laws, anti-trust laws, utility laws, and all the rest
subtly substituted for the old Court's more forthright fight over the constitu-
tionality of new legislation?
Because Mr. McCune is aware of this last question and Mr. Curtis either is
unaware of it or does not care to face it, The Nine Young Men, for all its
journalistic disjointedness, is a far more perceptive and useful book than the
superficially scholarly Lions Undcr the Throne. Mr. McCune, though he
pretends to no deep erudition and essays no philosophic furbelows in his re-
view of the Court's past ten terms, does appreciate the essentiality of the
economic decisions in which the Court has acted as overseer of government
regulation of business. He rates his nine young men according to their stands
on the economic issues as well as on the popularly publicized issues of civil
liberties. By so doing, he manages to rate them rather more accurately than
has any other recent writer of book or article, although Justice Jackson's ver-
bal brilliance seems to have blinded him a little in dealing with one of the
Court's two most obstructive members. These ratings are implicit in nine
chapters (interspersed among more general decision-discussing chapters) each
devoted to the life, personality, and judicial views of one of the Justices. As
one who recognized several phrases from his own past articles, borrowed
without quotes or credit, I think it fair for me to say that the life-and-per-
sonality stuff is largely second-hand rehash of published material. Inevitably,
too, I caught a few errors (though none so egregious as some of the nine
boners listed by Henry Steele Commager in his Herald-Tribune review of
Lions Under the Throne). But these minor gripes in no way detract from
my admiration for a competent, clear-headed, and amazingly complete report-
ing job. Not in itself any great or startling contribution to Supreme Court
literature, The Nine Young Men could well serve as a starting-point and a
handy warehouse for anyone anxious to take on a more ambitious task.
Mr. Curtis, for instance, might have profited by digesting it whole before
he wrote his own book on the Court. Or he might not. (Forgive me for
falling momentarily into the chopped-sentence chit-chat style which Mr. Cur-
tis affects and which some have admired. Not I. Like this. See?) In con-
trast to his conversational cosiness, Mr. Curtis' ideas are on a rather more
ambitious intellectual level. He is concerned with such matters as federalism
and dual sovereignty and tri-partite central government and the role of ju-
dicial review in relation to these. There is nothing much wrong with all this
political theorizing except that it goes on in something akin to an economic
vacuum. Though Mr. Curtis starts back with the Founding Fathers, he
might never have read Charles Beard or, for that matter, James Madison.
As he works up to date through the Court's history, Louis Boudin is con-
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spicuously not one of his references; he prefers Warren. Even in his tedi-
ously discursive chapter on "Old Court and New Deal," which adds nothing
to what has been better said, before and often; Mr. Curtis sticks to the ab-
stract convolutions of political and legal theory, with only a passing nod to
the protection of Big Business (his caps.) in the old Court's abuse of the
"due process" clauses.
When he gets around to today's Supreme Court in the last near-half of his
book, Mr. Curtis begins to omit not merely the economic issues behind cases
but even the economic cases themselves. No rate or patent or anti-trust
cases, no cases involving supervision of regulatory bodies, only a smattering
of minor tax and labor cases (with the emphasis always on non-economic
factors) contribute to Mr. Curtis' analysis of the present Court and its mem-
bers. Instead, he runs through a few small conflicts between state and na-
tional power and then, like a layman unable to comprehend the vast and dis-
parate business-vs.-government issues the Court has coped with, he stakes his
almost all on the civil liberties decisions. This strange selectivity, plus some
strained argumentation, lets Mr. Curtis come up with a clearly implied per-
sonal choice as the new Court's hero.
Now the choosing of judicial heroes-or for that matter, of judicial villains
-does not in itself vitiate or even taint a study of the Supreme Court. On
the contrary, since the Court is composed of nine distinct and intensely human
beings, such preferential judgments are inevitable on the part of any observer
and it is better that they be consciously made and honestly communicated than
that they be unconscious, unrecognized and so condescendingly unconceded.
Lar professors and others who would keep their Supreme Court scholarship
uncontaminated by personalities, uncomplicated by intellectual and emotional
differences which in fact exist, are all too likely to find the Court's decisions and
divisions incomprehensible, unpredictable, paradoxical and mysterious. As
Prof. Hamilton long ago perceived and Prof. LasswelU currently makes clear,
what we need in order to adequately analyze or understand the court is more,
not less, concentration on the separate justices as individuals. I have no
quarrel with Mr. Curtis' choosing of a hero for the Court; my quarrel is with
his choice of a hero. For his choice is Justice Felix Frankfurter.
To anyone who knows about Mr. Curtis, this should be no surprise. Mr.
Curtis is a Bostonian and a Harvard Law graduate who rates Prof. Thomas
Reed Powell, Justice Frankfurter's official apologist in the law reviews, as
"our great expert now" on constitutional law. In a book of quotations that
Mr. Curtis coedited a couple of years back, called The Practical Cogitator
or The Thinker's Anthology, there were four lengthy quotes and a short one
from Felix Frankfurter and none at all from Justices Black, Douglas, Mur-
phy, or even Stone. (Franklin Roosevelt got one and Abraham Lincoln
three.) So, in Lions Under the Throne, there are nineteen quotations from,
or references to, Justice Frankfurter-more than are allotted to Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge combined.
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Even beyond his case selectivity and his quantitative loading of the record,
Mr. Curtis works hard at touting his hero. He blandly quotes with apparent
admiration Frankfurter's loose talk (in a concurrence) of "discrimination"
as the basis of McCulloch v. Maryland-barely two pages after he himself
has said: "There was no discrimination . . ." He cites with obvious ap-
proval Frankfurter's participation in the joint dissent in McCarroll v. Di'de
Greyhoulnd Lins-and nowhere adds that Frankfurter repudiated this stand
well before Mr. Curtis' book was written. He beams at Frankfurter's "State
as a State" formula for dual-immunities tax cases, out of NAew Yorh v. U.S.
--without ever noting that the four separately concurring Justices, headed by
Stone, devoted much of their opinion to ridiculing the formula as utterly
meaningless. Most significantly, he pounces on two or three stray opinions
b7 Black and Douglas, worries and twists them until he can conclude that "the
mentality of these Justices" is ruled by "conceptual thinking" ("in the same
grooves which held the Old Court so fast") and triumphantly crowns Justice
Frankfurter, by contrast, as the Court's great "latitudinarian."
Leaving entirely aside the big economic cases, in which Mr. Curtis might
have found his so neat classification a touch difficult to apply, I should like
to pose Mr. Curtis a question or two, right on his own home grounds. Mr.
Curtis treats in his book of judicial limitations on the states' taxing power
under the commerce clause; Mr. Curtis also spends quite some time in his
book making fun of the old Court's rigid distinction, on an abstract level, be-
tween the "direct" and "indirect" affecting of interstate commerce. On Dec.
16, 1946, Justice Frankfurter spoke the opinion of the Court in Frecman v.
kezit, a case declaring a certain Indiana tax, as applied, an unconstitutional.
violation of the commerce clause (with Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy.
dissenting). Perhaps this decision came down after Mr. Curtis' book was at
the printer's; but surely a blanket classification of judicial "mentalities"
should hold as well for the future as the past-so no matter. In Freentapt v.
He-wit, Justice Frankfurter said the tax was bad because it was a "direct" tax
on interstate commerce. He did not explain why it was "direct"; he simply
said it was "direct" and said it ten times. How now, Mr. Curtis? Hovw
about the absurd conceptualism of deciding cases by drawing lines between
"direct" and "indirect," and how about the "latitudinarianism" of your fav-
orite Justice? Or do you still applaud Justice Frankfurter when he goes the
Bellman in Lewis Carroll's "The Hunting of the Snark" seven better? It
was the Bellman, you will recall, who remarked: "What I tell you three times
is true."
In all candor (with due apologies to Mr. Curtis who opines, revealingly,
that "candor can be very destructive") I confess to some small amusement at
the recent rash of writings in defense of Justice Frankfurter. From Prof.
Powell's involved and interminable concurring opinions in the Harvard Law
Review--through Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s, convenient but cock-eyed di-
chotomy, in Fortune, between the "judicial self-denial" of Frankfurter ct al.
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and the wicked "activism" of the Black-Douglas wing-on to this latest toss-
ing of a lopsided lance in Lions Under the Throne, they all try so desper-
ately to make a convincing liberal out of the little Justice. This quixotic
effort demands of its authors, a gallant if misguided crew, that they strain at
legalistic gnats and swallow a caravan of economic camels. For anyone who
reads the reporters whole can see, as did Mr. McCune, that the same old con-
servatism, poured into new containers, persists on the Court today-and that
Felix Frankfurter is its major prophet.
FRED RODELLt
In introducing courses on Constitutional Law and related subjects I tell my
students that one of the reasons a lawyer should be familiar with the work of
the Supreme Court is that much of its business makes the headlines, and the
layman will always ask the lawyer to explain its latest decisions as inade-
quately reported in the newspapers. But even when they have become law-
yers, I warn them, they will be no better equipped than the layman to explain
a Supreme Court decision unless they follow the current work of the Court
as news.
This seems to me just one of many ways to express the paradox of our
unique institution of judicial review: the Supreme Court is a court of law,
moving in the circle within which lawyers operate, but by and large it decides
issues of immediate political importance. Evidence of this paradox is the
recent appearance of two books for the layman about the Supreme Court.
Both books demonstrate the paradox. Mr. McCune, in' reportorial fashion,
both by se:ected subjects and by analyses of individual justices, tries to cover
the whole field of Supreme Court activity. The result is a confusion of law
and politics. Mr. Curtis.confines himself mostly to the Court and the Con-
stitution but he sets up his discussion on a philosophical plane and brings the
paradox out into the open.
No longer a layman, I cannot be sure how clear either of these books is to
the uninitiated. I suspect that the details of McCune's book may be confus-
ing but that the overall picture is lucid enough. It is full of errors, some
factual, many the kind that comes from condensing a twenty-page opinion
into three sentences, and a few that a student in the field would consider the
result of faulty analysis. But such errors, except of course factual ones,
seem to me inevitable in a popular book about the Court. The layman who
reads McCune's book will get a somewhat blurred picture of the Court's work
and of the people who do the work, but I think for all its blurred lines it is
not so misleading that it should be put on an Index of books forbidden to the
lay public.
Curtis has set his sights higher than McCune. He seeks to demonstrate to
the layman the nature of this paradox of the Court. And he also seeks to
t Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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work out a philosophy, satisfactory to him and presumably to the lay public,
that will, if followed by the Court, justify its place in our constitutional sys-
tem. The philosophy is, of course, one of "self-restraint." It is elaborated
in superb prose, but it boils down to a plea not to use power unwisely. By
this Curtis apparently means the Court should not stray far from what he
calls "our creed for the era."' As long as the present system is unchanged, I
suppose that is the best philosophy one can express. The trouble is that it
doesn't mean much. No justice presumably ever thinks he is using his power
unwisely. In most cases part of the public thinks the Court is "right"-i.e.,
using its power "wisely"-and part thinks the Court is "wrong"-i.e., using
its power "unwisely." Nor do I see that Curtis' conclusion satisfactorily
gets around the dilemma of judicial review-that is, that the debatable issues
of review are matters of opinion and if the nine young lions have the power,
they are entitled to use it according to their opinions; if they are not entitled
to exercise their power in this manner but are supposed to exercise it accord-
ing to our opinions, then take away the power and give it to us.
Whatever one thinks of Curtis' conclusion, his book is well written and
should be enlightening to the layman. In short, I think a layman would do
well to read both books, one for its bird's-eye survey of the facts, the other for
the philosophy of the institution. Likewise, a lawyer not specializing in the
work of the Court could read both with profit. And even the expert in the
field will find something in both: in McCune's a few new stories and in Cur-
tis' some old ideas dressed up in new and sparkling language.2
GEORGE D. BrALDsNut
In the present state of legal scholarship anyone who tries to describe the
social and personal factors that "explain" the responses of the Court is thrown
back on improvisation. He is in the same predicament as a writer setting
out to summarize the economic history of the United States on the basis of
the scholarship of 1900, when economic history was a catchall of haphazard
statistics, dramatic anecdotes, and impressionistic remarks. There was no
systematic picture of the fluctuating price level, or the changing structure of
saving, investment, employment, and standard of living.
The literature now available on the Court and the American judicial proc-
ess reads like the economic scholarship of the late Victorian era. There is no
systematic survey of the structure of Court opinion that makes full use of
the methods devised by modern research on semantics. There is no monu-
mental survey of comparative biography in which the technical apparatus of
1. P. 334.
2. It seems worthwhile to note that partisans of various justices vill hold strong
views. Friends of Justice Frankfurter, for example, will like Curtis and not McCune.
Friends of Justice Black vice versa. Thus, another demonstration of the paradox.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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sociology and psychiatry, for instance,. are effectively applied. Systematic
studies have yet to prepare the material on-the-basis of which the impact of
single factors, or groups of factors,,can be critically evaluated. (For instance:
What indicators are there of the impact of party politics, elected office, ad-
ministrative service, the army, business and different types of legal practice?
What of the personality structure of the bench? What of the effect of pres-
idential ambition and personal incompatibility upon the judicial process?
What indicators are there of the impact of various modes of legal education?
What evidences have there been of response of Courts to legal and profes-
sional criticism?)
No doubt the percolation of modem methods into legal scholarship will
result, over the next fifty years, in some improvement in the calibre -of ma-
terial at hand for the McCunes and Curtises of 1997. In the meanwhile a
steady trickle of inquiries into the legal process can exercise a certairr impact
upon. the level of rationality achieved by the judges participating in the legal
process itself, an impact curiously underemphasized, if not undervalued, in
the McCune-Curtis volumes.
The rationality of the judicial process is largely a matter of insight, which
depends upon awareness of predispositions of the self in relation to the en-
vironment. Since self-understanding is furthered by analysis of the self by
others, self-knowledge among the judges can be intensified when they see
themselves mirrored in the perspective furnished by the psychological and
social sciences. It is an opportunity, if not an obligation, of legal scholarship
to hold a mirror to the face of the Court.
It should not be imagined-as Mr. McCune erroneously imagines-that
more knowledge on the part of judges improves the certainty with which de-
cisions can be predicted. Rationality, on the contrary, may increase unpre-
dictability. After remarking that the pattern of the votes of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in relation to his brethren is fairly clear, McCune continues:
"However, this behavior pattern does not make Frankfurter's vote predictable,
not even against the background of volumes of his writing about the Court
and the Constitution. Theoretically it should; but the best test-reactions of
lawyers who have to follow the divisions closely-shows the professor to
be unpredictable".1
Theoretically, knowledge improves flexibility of the mental process, emanci-
pating the thinker from the simplifications of ignorance. Self-knowledge,
in particular, is calculated to emancipate the thinker from the automatic
compulsion of unrecognized bias, and in this way to enlarge the vision of
details and relations pertinent to the self (as well as to the environment)
which are taken into account in coming to a given result. It is not unlikely
that Mr. Justice Murphy, were he more aware of the factors within himself
that affect his "sensitivities", would be less rather than more predictable. (Me-
1. P. 99.
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Cune: "His vote:can be more nearly predicted than can that of any other
justice, which is-another way of saying that one can predict which cases will
offend Murphy's sensitivities.") 2 However, insight into sentiment and dich6
does not invariably produce changes in behavior: you may know that you
hate economic bigness and concentration partly on the basis of early identifica-
tions with "little" people, and you may nonetheless continue to oppose mon-
opoly.
The point is that there is no necessary tie between rationality and the cer-
tainty with which decisions can be foreseen. Indeed, predictability will be
welcomed by alert justices as an opportunity to raise within themselves a
question about the degree to which they are acting upon an overly rigid set of
predispositions when they are faced by the ever-unfolding semi-novelties of
human life.
HAROLD D. L.%sswEL tj
ScHoLARsHIP about the Supreme Court is in danger of being confused by
the divisions of the Justices. The New Court contains three or four strong-
minded,-colorful and assertive personalities, and some of them manifestly dis-
like each other. A good many of the law professors and other writers on these
matters vicariously share the joy of the judicial feuds. For some, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter is a King Charles' head, cropping up in every context, and always
the target for a rock-filled snowball; others find their view of the Court and
its work obscured by emotional attitudes towards other Justices, notably
Jackson, Black or Douglas. The New Supreme Court is hard enough to
understand.and to predict, without forcing all analysis to choose between
being pro- or anti-Mr. Justice Black. Any comparative survey of the work of
the Court reveals a most paradoxical inconsistency in the position of indi-
vidual Justices.' The attitudes of the Justices are a problem in national policy,
and the study of the Court's work is not advanced by the pressure of faction-
alism.
The program and policy of the New Supreme Court are in many ways a
mystery.
On the negative side what the Court has done is clear. The main positions
of the constitutional era which ended in 193'd have been reversed. The princi-
pal judicial limitations on economic regulation by Congress and by the states
have been abolished or greatly relaxed. The generalization could be qualified
a good deal in detail-particularly as to state taxes-but it is fair enough, for
most purposes. Old problems have taken on new urgency as a result of some
of these changes. The exercise by Congress of some of its new power over
2. P. 151.
t Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
1. See Comment, The Imagc in the Mirror 56 YALE L. J. 1356 (1947).
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commerce, for example, has raised many questions as to the scope of state
regulatory authority in the same area.2 But by and large, constitutional doubts
are ho longer a principal issue in the consideration and drafting of economic
and social legislation. Attention can now be focussed on the more funda-
mental problems of policy, rather than on the limited and sometimes in-
adequate target of constitutionality.
Once one gets past the New Court's nullification of the restrictive dogmas
of the Old Court, however, fog closes in. Clearly the New Court is sometimes
but not always in favor of civil liberties; it is sometimes but not always
against what is called "judicial legislation"; it supports the work of adminis-
trative agencies, although it divides sometimes on how far courts should see
to it that administrative bodies do what the courts think the legislatures have
told them to do.
These, however, are examples. The ultimate question is what the Court's
job is in American government, and how well it is doing it. This is the theme
of Lions Under The Throne, an urbane and thoughtful essay on judicial su-
premacy-not path-breaking, but altogether worth reading. Perhaps as a
consequence of his success as an anthologist, Mr. Curtis suffers from some
archness of style, and his book is full of tag ends out of Rabelais, Montaigne,
Bacon and Holmes, Holmes, Holmes. However, these are minor and personal
reading difficulties. Lions Under The Throne is mature and not without wit.
It is the comment of one of Holmes' good pupils on the paradox of the Su-
preme Court's function in a democratic society.
Mr. Curtis has not attempted a comprehensive report on the New Court,
nor a full history of the whole Court. He has sketched the historical growth
of the Supreme Court's special power in our system of government, through
its principal changes. His historical illustrations are few, but they establish a
realistic perspective. And he has attempted to formulate a conclusion of his
own as to how the Court should behave in relation to the other arms of gov-
ernment.
For better or for worse, Mr. Curtis believes, the practice of judicial su-
premacy should remain. The origins of the power are obscure and probably
illegitimate, but in his view the Court should keep its historic privilege of
declaring statutes unconstitutional. The privilege should be exercised warily,
prudently, and with a strong sense that the Court is only part of a complex
government which cannot work unless there is reasonable harmony among its
branches. Above all, the judicial power should be exercised for the great and
dominant purpose of helping to make government and society democratic.
Thus his first rule of judicial etiquette is that the Court should give full
faith and credit to the products of the democratic legislative process, just as
they have traditionally accepted on faith the verdict of a jury trial conducted
2. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1146 (1947) ; Rice v.
Board of Trade, 67 Sup. Ct. 1160 (1947).
1470 [Vol. 56
REVIEWS
according to the proprieties of common law. Such a policy of democratic
deference to the legislative and executive leaves considerable scope, however,
for the responsible exercise of judicial supremacy.
In the first place, personal liberties are the source of all things in democ-
racy, and they should be beyond legislative control. Mfr. Curtis quotes Justice
Jackson's vivid sentence: "One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elec-
tions."3 In Mr. Curtis' view it is or should be one of the Court's basic
responsibilities to assert the inviolability of civil rights.
Then there is a considerable number of statutes, Mr. Curtis argues, which
do not merit full faith and credit before the Supreme Court. Here he builds
on a suggestion of Chief Justice Stone4 to define a class of situations in which
the Court should make up its mind without the exercise of self-restraint.
These are cases in which those who bear the burden of the legislation are not
adequately represented in the legislature which makes the decision. In such
cases, Mr. Curtis urges, the legislative vote is not entitled to acceptance on
faith as the outcome of full democratic deliberation. In that sense it lacks
what should be regarded in a democracy as a species of procedural due
process. Mr. Curtis gives as examples state legislation affecting interstate
commrerce, California's attempt to bar the "Okies,"5 and action against minor-
ities feebly represented in the legislature. The list could easily be lengthened,
perhaps most notably by the problem of improper legislative districting pre-
sented in Colegrove v. Green.0 We have 150 years of experience in the in-
tensely difficult task of getting legislators from rotten boroughs to vote them-
selves out of power. Without judicial help, we can hardly succeed in giving
each citizen a vote of equal consequence, in legislative districts of equal size.
It is hard to imagine an issue of more importance to the entire process of
representative government, nor a case in which the Court failed more com-
pletely as an instrument of democratic purpose.
Judicial supremacy in these two areas, MNr. Curtis says, does not exhaust
the problem. "What is the Court's function and what are the limits of its
self-restraint when the democratic process is working, when it is not mutilat-
3. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633, (1943).
4. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U. S. 177,
185 (1938) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 46 (1940) ; Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 767-768 (1945). See also United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
5. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 174 (1941). Perhaps one should note the
view that in the field of interstate commerce the Congress can always overrule state legis-
lation if it wishes-a doctrine which ignores the realities of the legislative process, evades
judicial responsibility for the preservation of the national economy, and cannot he recon-
ciled with the Edwards case itself.
6. 328 U. S. 549 (1946), note, 56 Y.%Lp L.J. 127. Cf. Cook v. Fortson. 329 U. S. 675
(1947).
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ing itself, and when the legislation before the Court is the result? We must
look for an answer in a larger context than self-restraint or even faith in the
democratic process." 7 The answer, Mr. Curtis says, is that the Court must
act for our society, with its other organs of decision, as proponent and pro-
tector of the values which are the unstated premises, goals, needs and pur-
poses of our culture. The inescapable ethical ideas which determine how the
men of any time think and react will give ultimate shape to the process of
decision in the Supreme Court. The Justices cannot help being products of
their generation. It is best, therefore, for judges to be conscious of what
would otherwise be their unconscious motivation; to examine their private
yerities; to minimize personal predelictions; and to attempt as statesmen to
fulfill the underlying philosophic code of the society as a whole.
On this note, Mr. Curtis concludes. But it is a point of beginning, if the
conclusion, however correct, is to be more than platitude. What is the code
of our society, and what task does it set for Law in general, and the Supreme
Court in particular? Even if we wait for another Jefferson to write them
down for our time in general terms, what reflections of the unstated ultimates
can we find in the work of the present Court?
The weakest part of Mr. Curtis' book is its failure fully to meet the chal-
lenge of its own, conclusion. He does not affirmatively attempt to formulate
a full program for the Court, nor-.adequately to evaluate its performance.
The bulk of his chapters, indeed, is devoted to the Court which died, and
was reborn, in 1937.- It is a startling experience in many ways to review
the leading constitutional cases of the twenties and early thirties--monstrous
and fantastic they are now, both in reasoning and result. It is hard to believe that
it is little more than ten. years since the first Wagner Act decision, for the
Constitution of the Old .Court now seems a remote historical curiosity. Mr.
Curtis' spirited defense of President Roosevelt's court-packing plan, which
would have rocked the teacups in 1937, nowsounds serene, philosophic and
inevitable.
The pressing issue for the New Court is altogether different: to help artic-
ulate the public law of a free society, competent to fulfill its democratic dream
in the turbulent second half of the twentieth century. If this is the Court's
function, then self-restraint, even as modified by Mr. Curtis' necessarily broad
exceptions, is a working rule of limited utility. On those aspects of American
life which fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, the question becomes:
What positive goal is served by the Supreme Court's decision-or refusal to
decide? The generalities of Mr. Curtis' analysis-can be used in valuing the
work'of the Court when they have been carefully tested by application to ur-
gent current controversies, no less urgent when viewed in the long-range per-
spective of c6hstitutional structure. It is only after one has tried to formu-
late in detail the concrete purposes and problems of the Court for our time
7. LIoNs UNDER THE THRONE 328 (1947).
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that one can hope to achieve insight into its energetic divisions, and its
emerging pattern of decision. Admittedly the task will be difficult, for many of
the ideas we have inherited from Holmes, Brandeis and the other great teachers
of the last generation are no longer satisfactory. Yet surely it is a reviewer's
privilege to call for a positive doctrine of constitutionalism without supplying
one.
Mr. McCune's Nine Young MCn is almost totally useless for the purpose.
To be fair, it pretends to no such function. It is a relatively harmless and
gossipy piece of journalism, designed to give the lay public some idea of who
the justices are, and what they are doing. The portraits which emerge are
two-dimensiorial and distorted. Mr. McCune seems to think that most of
the cases before the C6urt represent a direct choice between the interests of
Big Business and the Common Man, and he is trying to work out a score-
card dividing the justices into liberals and conservatives in this sense.
The Supreme Court is an institution which, despite its abdication of many
powers, can still substantially influence the structure of American life. It
is concerned with the way in'vhich power and authority are distributed in our
society-with the status of the military; the relative importance of the states,
the regions, and the nation in a federal system; with the position of the indi-
vidual as a member of the community, in his capacity as a voter, a defendant
in criminal trials, a worker, trade union member, business man, farmer, in-
ventor and bankrupt. It can help or hinder in some, but not all, or even the
most important, of the economic processes of society. Thus it can settle dis-
putes concerning the relations between labor and management, the organiza-
tion of industrial markets, the administration of the tax laws, and the pro-
tection of patents. But it can do little or nothing to formulate fiscal policy,
foreign policy or banking policy. It has inherited a strange and mystic pres-
tige, and the power, when litigants present the opportunity, to strike an oc-
casional blow for Liberty.
Neither of these books provides a critical assessment of the Court's per-
formance, in the light of a philosophy of its function. Mr. Curtis has lim-
ited himself to broad and rather intangible aspects of the issue of judicial
supremacy, and Mr. McCune is out of his depth. The task for scholarship
in this field of constitutional law therefore remains to be done. It is the
most pressing of all the responsibilities of legal scholarship. For the Court
lacks an integrated and affirmative conception of its duty. It needs the benefit
of sustained, disinterested and detailed criticism of its work. And certainly
we need from. the Court a much better brand of constitutionalism and public
law than we are getting.
EuGENE V. RosTowt
t Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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